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Dissertation	  Summary	  
This dissertation falls under the umbrella of empirical studies on banking 
regulation that focus on bank conduct and strategy.  It adds the empirical banking 
literature by carrying out an investigation into the behavior of banks in response to 
capital, information asymmetry and explicit deposit insurance. This dissertation 
attempts to answer three main questions. How is the lending behavior of a bank 
affected by the banks maintained capital position? How does information asymmetry 
affect the capital position maintained by banks and does it justify the need for capital 
regulation? And finally how does the implementation of explicit deposit insurance 
affect the liability side of the banks balance sheet and its maintained leverage ratio? 
The dissertation is divided in to 3 chapters each focusing on answering on of the 
aforementioned questions. 
 The first question is answered by trying to find empirical evidence of what 
effects the behavior of the lending function of banks, does the bank capital position 
have any role to play in it and do Islamic banks exhibit the same behavior or not. In 
order to do so Panel data from Pakistan is used. Theory suggests that the bank 
changes its lending behavior when its CAR is closer to its lower bound. In other 
words, when the capital falls to a certain level close to the regulatory requirements the 
bank reduces it’s lending. This behavior is a consequence of the banks attempt to 
avoid falling below the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) that the regulatory authority in 
the country enforces on the banks. The study finds the presence of this nonlinear 
lending behaviour in Pakistani banks. It finds that Islamic banks also exhibit a similar 
behavior but the degree of the nonlinearity is lower in their case. Chapter 2 of the 
dissertation reports the complete study. 
In chapter 3 the second question is investigated.  An empirical study on how 
the capital structure of banks is influenced by the information asymmetry in the 
banking environment is carried out. The study incorporates corporate finance proxies 
for information asymmetry along with bank specific information asymmetry proxies 
to investigate this effect. It uses 1,638 listed and non-listed banks from 15 countries 
and finds evidence of a sizable and significant influence of information asymmetry on 
the capital structure of banks. It studies whether the determinants of capital structure 
of nonfinancial firms have any explanatory power on banks.  Substantive evidence of 
adverse effect of information asymmetry on the leverage ratio maintained by banks is 
found justifying the need for capital regulation.  
In chapter 4 an empirical analysis of the effect of explicit deposit insurance 
and its design on the liability structure of banks is investigated. It provides an insight 
into the behavior of the banks liability side balance sheet in response to explicit 
deposit insurance implementation. Data from 30 Asian countries is used in order to 
carry out this investigation. The study tests how the banks liability is affected because 
of the safety net and its design. The banks leverage ratio is determined by how the 
deposit and non-deposit liabilities respond to the explicit deposit insurance. It finds 
evidence of depositor shifting funds between the types of deposits in the bank as a 
result of the explicit deposit insurance. It provides evidence of the importance of 
setting the right coverage in order to prevent the adverse effects that the deposit 
insurance induces. It studies how the safety net design features affect the bank 
liability structure. The study finds that besides the explicit deposit insurance the bank 
liability structure is affected by other factors like tax expense, bank size, overhead and 
dividend pay-out. 
 
 	  
